The fix governs response-path isolation only: the request is allowed, tungsten
fetches the origin, and the response policy returns isolate with
file_download: true — which tungsten must collapse to content inspection, because a
binary download cannot be rendered remotely. To reach that path without a direct_on_allow
surrogate, each download below targets the host you loaded this page from (an allowed
host, since you reached the page) and carries a fake X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3 header so PE's
vulnerable-service detection returns isolate on the response.
isolate. This is what makes PE return
isolate on the response when it sees the fake X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3 these
links send. This is the whole point — without it the response is just allowed.allow at request time
(it does, since you reached the page). The request must pass through so tungsten fetches the origin
and reaches the response policy. Do not use an isolate. host here — that
isolates at request time and the thin client handles the download itself, bypassing this fix
entirely.content_inspect verdict actually scans and emits the Druid log.Page origin: . caesium serves identical content on every
hostname; the policy is applied by tungsten based on the target host below.
| File | What it exercises | Open |
|---|
req.action = allow (request passed through; no request-path isolation).resp.action = content_inspect (NOT isolate) — the fix collapsed the verdict.sha256_score and av_scan_result populated.caesium.menlotest.com, not isolate.) or the request policy is isolating. The fix
cannot run on a request-isolated download.resp.action = isolate (no collapse): PE returned isolate on the response
but without file_download: true, so the fix's input never occurred.